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The Impact of Compulsory





Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) of blue-collar services such as refuse
collection and street cleaning was introduced in the UK by the Local
Government Act 1988. This law, imposed by central government, obliged
elected local authorities to expose specific services to competitive tendering at
fixed intervals and subject to national guidelines. Whilst the issue of competitive
tendering of public services has generated a substantial literature over recent
years (see Domberger and Rimmer (1994) for a review), there have been
relatively few studies of compulsory competitive tendering.
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This paper uses a dataset on refuse collection costs and services for the 365
English local authorities over the period 1984-94. It follows on from Szymanski
and Wilkins (1993) who analysed the same database using data up until 1988
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Environment for supplying the cost data. He is also grateful to Paul Gregg, Ron Smith, Dick Sorabji and three
anonymous referees for helpful comments. Errors are, of course, his own.
2 Walsh (1991) reviewed the initial impact of CCT for the Department of the Environment on the management
of local authority services for a sample of 40 local authorities. More recently, a study by Escott and Whitfield
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relatively small number of case studies. There are a small number of academic studies including Painter (1991),
Shaw, Fenwick and Foreman (1994) and Patterson and Pinch (1995), but they had limited data sources on
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Thompson (1987) on CCT in the NHS.Fiscal Studies
2
when CCT was introduced. The main issues considered in this paper are the size
and distribution of cost savings that can be attributed to CCT, and the extent to
which the effects of competition interact with ownership (whether the contract is
won by the in-house public sector organisation or is won by a private contractor).
The paper also discusses changes in service specifications associated with CCT.
The most powerful evidence in the paper relates to the size and distribution of
cost reductions. Comparing the last full year before the first competitive tender
was held under the 1988 Act with the first full year after, 81 per cent of
authorities for which data were available showed a fall in net expenditure on
refuse collection services.
3 The total cost reduction in the sample was 19.5 per
cent (around £6 per household in 1995 prices). Evidence on the effect of
competitive tendering on quality is more limited. Using a questionnaire survey of
client-side managers to establish service characteristics following the
introduction of CCT and comparing this with Chartered Institute of Public
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) data for service characteristics before CCT,
there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that lower costs are a
consequence of lower standards in terms of service specifications.
The paper is set out as follows: in the next section, refuse collection services
are briefly described and the background to CCT is discussed; Section III
describes the dataset; Section IV reports the profile of cost changes resulting
from CCT; Section V presents an analysis of the impact of CCT on service
specifications; Section VI draws some general conclusions.
II. REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES AND COMPULSORY
COMPETITIVE TENDERING
1. Refuse Collection Services
Refuse collection services have been extensively researched by economists
interested in the effects of competitive tendering. Work in the US and Canada
includes Savas (1977), Stevens (1978) and McDavid (1985). Work in the UK
includes the Audit Commission (1984), Domberger, Meadowcroft and
Thompson (1986), Cubbin, Domberger and Meadowcroft (1987) and Szymanski
and Wilkins (1993).
Refuse (solid waste) collection is a very simple economic activity.
Householders leave their refuse at some agreed location and the service
operators place the waste in a collection truck and then drive it to a disposal site
where it is deposited. To provide the service, the operator requires loaders and
drivers, collection vehicles, a depot for the vehicles and a disposal site. In the
                                                                                                                                   
3 That is, 266 out of 328 authorities. For the second year after the tender was held, 259 out of 315 (82 per cent)
registered a fall in net expenditure.Impact of CCT on Refuse Collection
3
UK, disposal sites are typically owned by local authorities and offer fixed scales
of charges. Most of the cost of the collection service is the cost of labour
(usually over 50 per cent).
Cost variations can arise from four sources.
4
•   Authority-specific endowments: the number of collection units, the
breakdown between households and commercial premises, the density of
collection units and the proportion that are urban or rural, as well as
idiosyncratic local features.
•   Service specification: collection point (back door, kerbside etc.), frequency of
collection (once a week, more than once a week etc.), type of container
(plastic sacks, wheelie bins etc.) and whether it is provided by the operator
(free or at a charge), occasional special collections for bulky items (free or at
a charge) and the provision of recycling facilities.
•   Productivity of labour and equipment: these basically depend on
organisational efficiency, which consists of an efficient operational plan and
effective monitoring of the work-force. There is very little variation
nationally in the technology of refuse collection and the capital used. The
market for vehicles and other equipment is essentially national.
•   Input prices: the main source of variation between authorities relates to the
wage bill and variations may exist because of local market factors (for
example, London wage rates tend to be higher) and authority-specific policies
which can mean that pay levels may exceed the market rate.
2. Competitive Tendering, CCT and Changing Costs
A brief history of the organisation of refuse collection services prior to 1988 is to
be found in Szymanski and Wilkins (1993). The main point in relation to this
paper is that, prior to the 1988 Act, most local authorities operated refuse
collection services through what is now known as the Direct Service
Organisation (DSO), basically a department of the local authority operating
under monopoly conditions. Despite the introduction of competitive tendering by
a small number of local authorities (a purely voluntary act by those authorities)
and the well-documented cost reductions associated with such policies (whether
contracts were won in-house or were contracted out to private operators — see
Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) and Cubbin, Domberger and
Meadowcroft (1987)), the policy was not widely adopted.
In February 1985, the Conservative government announced plans to extend
competition to local authority services;
5 a Bill was introduced in June 1987 and
passed in April 1988. The Act required that defined activities, including refuse
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collection, street cleaning, building cleaning, schools and welfare catering,
grounds maintenance and vehicle maintenance, should be supplied under
competitive conditions, and it laid down a timetable with dates by which specific
services had to be subjected to competition.
6 Where the authority intended to
allow the existing in-house team (the DSO) to compete, the Act laid down
guidelines to ensure fair competition, including ring-fencing the DSO and a
minimum rate of return on assets (5 per cent). The Act has frequently been
supplemented by guidance from the Department of the Environment as to the
conduct of competitive tendering.
The rationale behind CCT might be thought to accord with standard
economic theory.
7 Refuse collection constitutes a natural local monopoly
because of ‘economies of contiguity’: it is cheaper for a single vehicle and
operating team to collect waste from a given street than for several competing
operators to do so (Stevens, 1978). However, under monopoly conditions, an
operator may be able to extract rents from a local authority because of
asymmetric information problems such as the limited observability of effort or
the inability of the authority to identify the operator’s underlying efficiency.
Demsetz (1968) pointed out that a competitive auction for the natural monopoly
can compete away some or all of the rent that the operator extracts (for example,
a formal model of this mechanism is analysed in the work of Laffont and Tirole
(1987) on auctioning incentive contracts).
8 One important issue that has
frequently arisen in the discussion of competitive tendering is whether
ownership matters. If competitive tendering competes away rents, then in
principle any public sector organisation that wins a contract should be capable of
delivering the same service at the same cost as a private sector organisation.
However, empirical evidence on refuse has often contradicted this view. Stevens
(1978) found that private firms were significantly cheaper in US cities of over
50,000 inhabitants and McDavid (1985) found an even larger difference for
Canada. The data used by Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) and
Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) found no significant difference between public
and private contracting, although in both cases the estimated cost reductions
were usually greater for private sector contractors.
Opposition to CCT has been motivated by both political and economic
considerations. The political critique of CCT has centred around the notion that
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public service and local government should not be organised on the basis of
market mechanisms. For example, Stewart (1991) argues that substituting
contractual relationships for traditional local government organisations will
reduce political accountability and impair the public service ethic. The economic
critique of CCT can be summarised under the following headings:
•   CCT is not cost-effective (for example, Kerr and Radford (1995));
•   CCT reduces service standards (for example, PSPRU (1992));
•   CCT has only achieved cost reductions through wage cuts and deteriorating
working conditions (for example, Escott and Whitfield (1995a)).
The political critique is beyond the scope of the current paper,
9 which focuses
on purely economic issues related to CCT. The data in this paper shed light on
the first of the economic issues in the narrow sense of direct cost to the taxpayer.
Section V considers service standards in relation to contract specifications.
III. DATA
The existing published analysis of CCT is almost entirely based on case studies.
The largest such exercise was reported in Walsh (1991) and Walsh and Davis
(1993), who reported the experience of a panel of 40 local authorities over the
period 1989-92. For most of their research on individual services, sample sizes
were no larger than 30. Other case-study work on specific issues includes Escott
and Whitfield (1995a), who looked at equal opportunities issues in a sample of
39 authorities, Shaw, Fenwick and Foreman (1994), who sampled 23 councils in
the north of England and their experience of CCT, and Painter (1991), who
obtained evidence from various sources on the first round of CCT on different
variables ranging from several hundred observations to as few as 34.
Whilst case-study evidence is important in understanding the way in which
CCT has been implemented, it is problematic when addressing the broader
economic issues such as the absolute size of cost reductions and changes in
average employment, wage and service levels. Local authority characteristics
vary widely along several dimensions (for example, size, density of population,
political control) and so inference based on small samples is hazardous. The
dataset assembled for this paper is based on a large sample of the 365 local
authorities in England responsible for refuse collection over the period 1984-94.
Five data sources were used.
•   Local authority expenditure on and income from refuse collection services
were taken from accounting returns supplied by the Department of the
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Environment
10 for which there are 3,804 observations out of a population of
4,015 (that is, 95 per cent coverage).
•   Authority-specific characteristics (number of household and commercial
collection units, density of units, type of authority) were drawn from
published government sources and these are included for all authorities in the
dataset. Local wage rates were proxied by weekly full-time male manual
earnings
11 reported in the New Earnings Survey. This provides details for all
33 Boroughs in Greater London but the remaining authorities are grouped
under county boundaries. Thus the remaining 332 authorities are allocated
between 38 county groups.
•   The pre-CCT service specification data were based on the CIPFA survey data
used by Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), Cubbin,
Domberger and Meadowcroft (1987) and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993).
These data run from 1984 to 1988 and provide information on the method of
collection (back-door, kerbside, other), the frequency of collection and the
provision of containers, all in terms of percentage of households receiving a
particular service standard. Each pre-CCT variable has around 300
observations for each year (around 80 per cent coverage), apart from 1988,
when the coverage declined to around 200.
12
•   The post-CCT data were based on a specially commissioned survey of local
authority client managers. The survey was carried out in 1994 and asked the
same questions on service standards as the CIPFA survey but only asked the
manager to state the service delivered to the majority of households. Two
hundred and thirty-nine usable responses were received (a response rate of 65
per cent; see Bello (1994) for more details).
13
•   The date at which the first competitive tender was held was taken from the
Contracts Handbook (CDC Research, 1994) which provides statutory
information on contracts covered by the 1988 Local Government Act, and for
this service 95 per cent of all start dates were known.
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11 According to Escott and Whitfield (1995a), whose report was commissioned by the Equal Opportunities
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12 Once it was clear the legislation on CCT would be passed, authorities were reluctant to reveal any
information that was considered commercially sensitive.
13 Both pre- and post-CCT surveys asked for information on recycling but the effects of the Environmental
Protection Act mean that direct comparisons are not feasible. Data on wage and employment levels, even if
available, would not now be released on grounds of commercial sensitivity. Because CCT has meant that
service standards are now fixed contractually, the answers to the 1994 questionnaire were taken to apply to the
service in each year of the current contract (in virtually all cases, this was the first contract signed under 1988
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IV. CCT AND THE PROFILE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY REFUSE
COLLECTION COSTS
1. Summary Statistics
As suggested in Section I, there appears to have been a reduction in costs
associated with the introduction of CCT. The measure of cost used here is net
annual expenditure by the local authority deflated by the retail price index (RPI).
Net expenditure is the total expenditure on providing the service less any income
generated from selling services (such as commercial waste collection).
14 The
data include not only amounts paid to the contractor, but also any administrative
costs borne by the client, including any costs associated with retendering in the
case of defaults, and so can be considered to be the total cost associated with
provision of the service (at least as far as the client is concerned). Table 1 is a
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comparison of the last full year before the first competitive tender was held
under the 1988 Act with the first full year after (under the Act, each authority
was given a date by which a tender had to be held, so that nation-wide the
introduction of CCT was staggered).
The table shows that the average reduction across all authorities was 19.5 per
cent but that larger percentage reductions were achieved on average in the larger
Metropolitan authorities and London Boroughs. The table also suggests that
costs fell by roughly the same percentage in London, where private contractors
won nearly half of the contracts, as in the Metropolitan Districts, where private
contractors won less than one in six contracts.
FIGURE 1
Refuse Collection Costs, 1984-94
Note: The year in which the first compulsory competitive tender was held differs between authorities
The long-term trend is illustrated in Figure 1. It is based on the full,
unbalanced sample in the dataset and represents the sum of expenditure of all
authorities divided by the total number of collection units for those authorities.
While the overall trend of both total and net expenditure is downward, it is clear
that there is a step fall in costs associated with competitive tendering. The fall is
slightly greater for net expenditure than for total expenditure, indicating that part
of the reduction in net expenditure has arisen from increased income (user
charges), which on average rose by 17 per cent. However, because user charges
are only a small fraction of total expenditure, these can account for only a small
proportion of the reduction in net expenditure. The figure also suggests that there
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there are only 150 observations of expenditure four years after the introduction
of CCT, compared with over 300 for the dates -6 to +2.
2. Regression Analysis
A more detailed analysis of the impact of CCT can be made using regression
analysis. The standard specification used in the literature can be derived as a cost
function under the assumption of cost minimisation from a Cobb-Douglas
production function. Differing authority endowments and service standards are
modelled as vectors pre-multiplying the production function
15 (for a full
derivation, see Stevens (1978)). This specification can then be estimated by
ordinary least squares (OLS) (for example, Stevens (1978), Domberger,
Meadowcroft and Thompson (1987) and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993)).
In the regressions from which the results reported below were drawn, the
same explanatory variables, described in Section III, are used as in Domberger,
Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993). Time
dummies are used to control for year effects. As well as a pooled OLS
regression, a model with fixed effects is also estimated. The coefficients on the
explanatory variables in the pooled OLS model were broadly in line with
previous research. Authority size in terms of collection units was the single most
significant explanatory variable, with a coefficient of around 0.95, significantly
smaller than unity, implying some economies of scale. A greater share of
housing in the total number of collection units implies lower costs, while the
higher the going weekly wage rate locally for manual males, the higher the cost
of the service. Authorities in London and in Metropolitan areas tend to have
higher costs, a finding normally attributed to the greater distance to disposal
sites.
A full set of the regression outputs is available on request from the author.
However, the focus here is the profile of cost reductions following CCT. In the
top panel of Table 2, the estimated percentage cost reductions attributable to the
impact of voluntary competitive tendering (before 1988) and to CCT are
compared. Results for both the fixed-effects and pooled models are reported. The
table indicates that both voluntary and compulsory competitive tendering
reduced costs significantly. The pre-CCT estimates are consistent with earlier
research, although in the fixed-effects model, there appears to be virtually no
cost saving attributable to competitive tendering that awards the contract in-
house. Following the introduction of CCT, the estimates indicate that DSOs
reduced costs by around 10 per cent while private contractors tended to reduce
costs by around 20 per cent.
16 Given that DSOs have won around 70 per cent of
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                    ,
where Q is output proxied by the number of collection units and A is the vector of service characteristics.
16 The restriction of coefficient equality can be easily rejected.Fiscal Studies
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all contracts, this is a striking result. There is no evidence to support the view
that there was any systematic difference in costs comparing these two groups of
authorities before the introduction of CCT. Prior to the introduction of CCT,
authorities where private contractors subsequently won tended, on average, toImpact of CCT on Refuse Collection
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have the same level of costs as authorities where the DSO subsequently won.
The only clear difference between the group of authorities that contracted out
and those that did not was their political control: the former authorities had on
average twice as many Conservative as Labour members. By contrast, where
DSOs won, there were on average as many Labour as Conservative members.
17
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the profile of cost reductions associated
with CCT over time. For both private and public contractors, the size and
significance of the coefficients tend to fall over time. For private contractors, the
coefficients are significant for all years in both models. Ignoring the fifth year
(for which there are so few cases), there does appear to be a pattern of eroding
benefits from CCT. For private contractors, cost reductions are halved by the
fourth full year of the contract. This may be associated with the fact that the
fourth year is, in most cases, also the last full year before the service was due to
be tendered again. However, overall, the pattern of cost reductions is relatively
stable for the first three years.
For contracts awarded to the DSO, the cost reductions only appear to be
significant in the first and second full years after the initial tender, while in the
third, fourth and fifth years, costs are not significantly different from those in the
last full year before CCT. The cost savings are much lower than where contracts
are awarded to private contractors. These results seem to suggest that ownership
does indeed matter. This is an issue that clearly requires some explanation, but
sadly no systematic evidence is currently available. Contractors blame
authorities for deliberately discouraging competition and favouring the DSO (for
example, BRMB (1995)). Authorities claim that the private sector is not
interested in making the required effort (Audit Commission, 1993, p. 17).
18
One issue that it is possible to investigate is the size of cost savings by yearly
cohort. This is reported in Table 3. The data indicate that where the number of
cases is small (25 or less), there is no cost reduction identifiable with CCT.
There is considerable variation depending on when the contract was let. Where
private contractors won, cost savings were around 25 per cent in 1989, 1991 and
1992. In 1990, however, cost savings were closer to 15 per cent. For contracts
won by the DSO, there was no measurable impact in 1989, a cost saving of
around 10 per cent for contracts let in 1990 and 1991, but an even larger saving
of around 17 per cent in 1992. It would be difficult to identify any particular
pattern emerging from this table. However, it does show that when comparison
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authorities awarding contracts to private contractors was 49, of whom 23 were Conservative and 11 were
Labour. Where contracts were awarded in-house, the average number of members was 48, of whom 18 were
Conservative and 18 were Labour. The figures for political control were based on the post-May-election data in
the 12-month period before the award of the contract and were taken from the Municipal Yearbook.
18 One explanation, suggested by a referee, is that where DSOs won, there may have been relatively few bids,
so that it is truly competition that matters, and DSO victories are proxies for lack of competition. Data on the
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12
of private contractors with DSOs is restricted to contracts let in the same year,
the estimated cost reductions are always larger where contracts are awarded to
private contractors (ignoring 1993, for which there are only 14 observations).
V. CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS
Controversy over the impact of competitive tendering in general and CCT in
particular on the quality of services delivered has been fierce. It is important
from the outset to distinguish quality in two senses:
•   ex-ante quality as laid down in the contract specification;
•   ex-post quality in terms of what is actually delivered.
Quality may fall following the introduction of competitive tendering even if the
specification of the service is raised, because the contractor may fail to achieve
the required standard. On the other hand, quality may rise even if the contractor
defaults on the contract specification, because the achieved standard is still
better than what went before.Impact of CCT on Refuse Collection
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Evidence on CCT has pointed to some problems both in terms of contract
specification and in terms of ex-post performance. The Audit Commission
(1993) has criticised authorities in specific areas (such as schools cleaning) for
poor contract specifications. Walsh and Davis (1993) found in their survey that
although specifications tended to be of the same standard as before CCT, service
delivery often fell well below the contract specification. Critics have argued that
private contractors have been particularly poor at delivering contract standards
(based on large surveys by both the PSPRU (1992) and LGMB (1993)).
19
However, refuse collection services appear to have suffered fewer problems
than other services subject to CCT. This is in part because the service is
relatively simple and so service specification is relatively easy. Above all, since
contract performance means collecting household waste on time without leaving
any mess behind, households take on the role of unpaid monitors with some
enthusiasm, which means that contract defaults (which trigger penalty clauses)
seldom go unnoticed. Usually, it is simply too costly for a contractor to try to
undercut the specifications laid down in the contract. The Consumers’
Association (1995) carried out a postal survey of members in 1994 and obtained
22,209 responses; 86 per cent of respondents were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘very
satisfied’ with their service. It also found no significant difference between
authorities where the contract had gone to private companies and authorities
where the DSO had won.
The measure of quality contained in the current dataset relates to service
specification. Therefore these data are unable to shed any light on the issue of
ex-post service quality. However, it has been argued that the cost reductions
described in the previous section have resulted from a reduction in the
specification of standards (a suggestion made, for example, by Escott and
Whitfield (1995a)). Prior to CCT, few authorities specified standards explicitly.
However, surveys carried out by CIPFA provided data on the nature of the
service provided which were used in previous analysis such as Domberger,
Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993). These
have been matched with the survey carried out by Bello (1994) described above.
The CIPFA data measured specifications along five dimensions: point from
which waste is collected (back door, kerbside or some variant on these two),
provision of containers by the authority (and whether or not they are provided
free), provision of special collections (for bulky waste), collection frequency
(once, more than once or less than once a week) and recycling services.
Recycling is impossible to compare properly since there is considerable variation
in the details of recycling policies between councils. Following the 1990
Environmental Protection Act, councils will eventually have to expand their
recycling services considerably. However, under current transitional rules,
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authorities have limited obligations and recycling remains a low-key affair. The
CIPFA questionnaire required each authority to specify the proportion of each
household receiving a particular service, while the Bello survey was based on
yes / no responses for a majority of households. It turns out that all authorities
have provided once-a-week collections and occasional special collections for a
majority of householders both before and after CCT. Thus the two main
differences in service standards in the data concern the location from which
waste is collected and the extent to which containers are supplied either free or
for a fee.
Tables 4 and 5 indicate the evolution of service specification standards over
time. Table 4 is a transition matrix comparing a matched set of authorities for
1988 and 1994. It indicates the secular decline in back-door collection and the
increase in kerbside / front-of-property collection, long advocated by the Audit
Commission (for example, Audit Commission (1984)) as a way to save costs
(even though this clearly implies a lower standard of service for the
householder). As far as service to the consumer is concerned, the only obvious
loss in service standards is a switch from back-door to kerbside or front-of-
property collection which occurred in only 25 per cent of authorities in the
matched sample. Along this dimension, service standards appear to have fallen in
a quarter of all authorities. However, for 73 per cent of authorities, the method of
collection was unchanged between 1988 and 1994.
Table 5 presents the summary statistics on provision of containers. Virtually
all client managers who stated in 1994 that containers were provided said they
were provided free, while before 1988 a significant proportion said they were
provided according to a scale of charges. There is potential for confusion here. A
typical authority supplying plastic sacks will provide one sack per week, and any
further sacks required have to be bought. The most reliable guide is therefore
likely to be obtained by looking at the total column. Prior to 1988, around 25 per
cent of respondents said that containers were provided as against 61 per cent of
respondents in 1994. In a balanced sample of 144 authorities, the increaseImpact of CCT on Refuse Collection
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appears less dramatic but still represents an increase of 50 per cent in the number
of authorities providing containers. Along this dimension, service standards
appear to have improved.
It appears, therefore, that in a small proportion of authorities, standards have
fallen measurably in one dimension; in a larger proportion, they have risen along
another dimension. This still represents a limited measure of quality, and only in
an  ex-ante (service specification) sense. However, if ex-ante standards were
being cut in order to reduce costs, we might expect to see this showing up in the
cost regressions. Thus if lower service standards explained lower costs, then the
CCT dummy variable would either fall in size or become insignificant once
quality specifications were included. Four model specifications were examined:
the pooled and fixed-effects models described in the previous section, a model in
which service standards were instrumented by their lagged values (to control for
possible endogeneity) and a sample selection model given that the quality
variables covered only just over half the population (2,018 observations out of
4,015).
20 In each model, the estimated coefficients for CCT dummies, either for
private contractors or for DSOs, were both larger than when the quality variables
were not included
21 and statistically significant, indicating that the reductions in
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parties were used as explanatory variables. The number of Labour members had a negative and statistically
significant coefficient, while the number of Conservative members had a positive and statistically significant
coefficient (both at the 5 per cent level).
21 In any case, the restriction that the quality variables were not significantly different from zero was not
accepted by the data. The estimated coefficients were broadly similar to those reported by Domberger,Fiscal Studies
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cost associated with CCT could not be attributed to lower service standards or
specifications.
22 The data used here cannot shed any light on the issue of ex-post
quality and competitive tendering. However, they do suggest that CCT has not
led to a general decline in service specifications, and that where cost reductions
have been large, they have not in general been achieved by erosion of service
specifications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As far as refuse collection is concerned, it seems indisputable that there has been
a significant reduction in cost following the introduction of compulsory
competitive tendering. There is some support for the view that the reductions are
not fully sustained over time. This evidence seems particularly strong for the
majority of contracts that were awarded in-house. The evidence that cost
reductions are not sustained where the contract is awarded to a private contractor
is much weaker. When the 1995 and 1996 data become available, it will be
possible to see whether cost reductions achieved in the first round of competitive
tendering were sustained into the second round.
The data used in the paper strongly suggest that ownership, as well as
competition, matters. Authorities that let contracts to private contractors
achieved significantly higher cost reductions than authorities that let contracts to
the DSOs. Contractors claim that many authorities discriminate against private
contractors, while some authorities claim that contractors are only interested in
cherry-picking the best contracts. For the dataset used in this paper, no
characteristic of authorities awarding contracts to their DSO could be identified
apart from their political control, with Labour members twice as heavily
represented compared with authorities that awarded contracts to the private
sector.
Cost reductions in this service can arise from productivity increases, falling
service quality or worse terms and conditions for the labour force. No evidence
was found to support the notion that cost reductions arose through setting lower
service specifications. Many critics of CCT believe that contractors (particularly
in the private sector) fail to meet specifications, but this issue could not be
addressed using the current dataset. These critics also suggest that cost
reductions have arisen through lower wage rates and poorer terms and conditions
(see, for example, Ganley and Grahl (1988), Walsh and Davis (1993), Painter
(1991), Shaw, Fenwick and Foreman (1994) and Escott and Whitfield (1995b)).
The dataset used here contains only evidence on pre-CCT wage and employment
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costs by between 10 and 20 per cent (relative to back-door collection) and free provision of containers adding
about 7.5 per cent to costs.
22 The regression output, not reported here, is available on request from the author.Impact of CCT on Refuse Collection
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rates and therefore we are unable to examine the actual level of post-CCT wages
and employment. However, it is the case that authorities in the dataset with
above-average employment levels and wage rates pre-CCT tended to reduce
costs by more than the average, comparing cost levels in the last year before
CCT and the first year after CCT.
23 More work is required on this important
issue.
Compulsory competitive tendering is a controversial policy which is
advanced as a significant policy success by the present Conservative government
and which the Labour Party promises to abolish if it is elected. The findings of
this paper suggest that a change of national policy may not make much
difference: where private contractors are already established, competitive
tendering is likely to continue. Where DSOs have retained the contract,
compulsory competitive tendering has had a relatively small impact.
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